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Abstract—The past few years have seen several studies 
reporting on the role of a Security Operations Center (SOC) 
analyst and metrics for assessing the performance of analysts. 
However, research suggests that analysts are dissatisfied with 
existing metrics as they fail to take into consideration several 
aspects of their tasks. Existing works advocate for research 
into this area. A major challenge to devising adequate metrics 
is that the real work of analysts that needs to be taken into 
consideration to assess their holistic performance has not been 
fully discussed. Furthermore, at present, there is no agreement 
on what constitutes core analysts’ functions. Analysts’ overall 
performance in a SOC could be obtained if there is a common 
agreement on the core functions upon which their performance 
can be evaluated. In this paper, we propose a framework 
depicting the core functions of analysts and KPIs that can be 
used to measure the performance of analysts. To do this, we 
conducted a thorough analysis of the functions of a SOC 
described in multiple sources of literature and engaged with 
several analysts and SOC managers from different industries 
using qualitative semi-structured interviews. Our research 
results identify the following: quality of analysts’ analysis, 
quality of analysts’ report, time-based measures and the absolute 
numbers derived from an analyst’s tasks as the key performance 
indicators (KPIs) for assessing analysts’ performance. We hope 
that our findings will stimulate more interest among 
cybersecurity researchers on assessment methods for analysts. 
Keywords— Security Operations Center, Analysts’ 
Functions, Analysts’ Metrics, Performance Metrics, Key 
Performance Indicator 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cybersecurity incidents and attacks usually cause severe 
financial and reputational damage to organisations. For 
example, a report by the UK’s Department of Health in 
2018 indicates that the WannaCry ransomware cost the 
National Health Service (NHS) roughly £92 million [1]. To 
detect malicious activities and to reduce the damage caused 
by cybercriminals, organisations typically rely on several 
preventative and defensive strategies [2].  Amongst these 
strategies is the use of a security operations center (SOC). A 
SOC is a centralized location inside or outside an 
organisation comprising of a specialized team of IT 
professionals that support businesses to deal with 
cybersecurity incidents [3].  
SOCs are being used by both private and public sector 
organisations to monitor their enterprise network, to detect 
attacks, respond to cyber threats and address incident 
management activities [4]. The growing use of SOCs has led 
to several studies on SOCs and their operations [5]–[8]. 
Despite being a widely researched topic, there are some 
aspects of SOCs that have still not been adequately 
addressed [4], [9]. Areas that have not been adequately 
addressed include adequate metrics for SOC analysts; the 
factors that need to be taken into consideration when 
evaluating effort of analysts holistically; and strategies for 
addressing the challenges faced by analysts [4], [9]–[11].  
Although there have been some suggestions from 
cybersecurity researchers and writers on the role of analysts 
[12], [13], along with some metrics for assessing their 
performance, the emerging consensus amongst researchers 
is that there is a need to improve metrics for the analysts [4], 
[8], [9]. In fact, an anthropological study conducted by 
Sundaramurthy et al. [14] found that analysts are 
particularly dissatisfied with existing metrics as they fail to 
take into consideration several aspects of their functions. 
The literature also suggests that the lack of adequate 
assessment method causes frustration for both analysts and 
SOC managers [14].  Despite this problem, there are very 
few attempts from researchers to investigate how existing 
metrics for the analysts can be improved, or the main factors 
that should be taken into consideration when assessing the 
performance of analysts. 
An objective of this paper is to contribute towards filling 
the current gap in the literature on the absence of clear 
understanding of key functions of a SOC analyst and of the 
factors/criteria that should be taken into consideration to 
evaluate analysts’ performance. It is our contention that the 
lack of a clear delineation of analysts’ functions within a 
SOC contributes to the present problem. Our proposition is 
that, by focusing on the daily tasks and functions of an 
analyst, a framework can be developed that highlights the 
aspects of analysts’ operations that should be used to assess 
their holistic performance.  
In this paper, we propose a framework on the main 
functions of analysts in a SOC along with the key factors 
that should be taken into consideration by SOC stakeholders 
and cybersecurity researchers when assessing the 
performance of analysts. Dafikpaku [15] defines a 
framework as an outline or overview of interlinked 
items/activities built to facilitate an approach towards 
achieving a specific goal. Drawing on this understanding, 
we present an overview and an outline of analysts’ functions 
and criteria by which analysts can be assessed using a 
framework to facilitate our goal towards designing a 
comprehensive approach for evaluating analysts’ overall 
performance. We extrapolate the functions expected of a 
SOC analyst from what we call “Global SOC Functions” by 
identifying services offered by a SOC and mapping the 
activities of analysts to these functions. We report the 
following factors and criteria: quality of an analyst’s 
analysis, quality of an analyst’s report, time-based 
measures and absolute numbers derived from analysts’ tasks 
as the main KPI relevant to obtaining the overall 
performance of an analyst. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study to identify and present the main KPI for 
capturing analysts’ performance based on several aspects of 
analysts’ function using empirical data collected from 
analysts and SOC managers.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section II presents background information. Section III 
presents the methodology adopted for this study. In Section 
IV, we present our analysis and study findings. Section V 
presents our discussion. Section VI introduces our proposed 
framework, followed by Section VII which discusses related 
work. Section VIII concludes the paper. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Role of the Analyst    
A SOC does not function by itself, but rather it is 
supported by a number of teams who work collaboratively 
to achieve the SOC’s objectives [6]. While roles such as 
SOC analysts, SOC engineers, SOC manager, along with a 
chief information security officer (CISO), exist in most 
SOCs, prior works suggest that analysts are responsible for 
threat identification; analyzing security incidents; and 
recommending mitigation actions to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of an 
organisation’s information systems [8], [14].  
Most SOCs generally operate a tiered team structure 
with specific role assignments to analysts: Tier 1 analysts 
(level 1 analysts); Tier 2 analysts (level 2 analysts); and Tier 
3 analysts (level 3 analysts) [4]. Tier 1 analysts are 
oftentimes the junior analysts and the least experienced 
analysts [16]. Tier 1 analysts are responsible for all initial 
investigations, triaging of events and deal with the majority 
of all incidents [8]. They are also responsible for attending 
to most phone calls and emails directed to the SOC. 
Additionally, Tier 1 analysts are responsible for raising 
initial tickets on events that require investigation, 
performing initial analysis, managing the tickets until it is 
resolved and closed. Tier 1 analysts will escalate incidents 
they cannot resolve to Tier 2 analysts. 
Tier 2 analysts are responsible for in-depth analysis of 
incidents escalated by a Tier 1 team [8]. Once they receive 
or identify an incident, the Tier 2 team will be responsible 
for its management until it is closed or escalated to Tier 3 
analysts. Depending on the nature of an organisation, Tier 2 
analysts may have responsibilities such as signature tuning; 
writing use cases and amending existing use cases; basic 
device configurations such as the installation of IPS, IDS, 
vulnerability management; configuring log and event 
collectors [17].  
Tier 3 analysts are usually the most experienced 
analysts. The Tier 3 team are expected to possess and 
demonstrate a higher level of competences within the 
domain of cybersecurity. The day-to-day role of members 
within Tier 3 includes management of incidents escalated by 
Tier 2; sharing and managing threat intelligence; 
implementation, configuration and optimization of security 
tools. Tier 3 analysts may also write customized signatures; 
create use cases and maintain security policies on security 
solutions such as firewalls, intrusion detection and 
prevention systems; and in some cases act as consultants to 
SOC managers [17]. It is important to note that despite the 
tier structure, many of the tasks and responsibilities may 
overlap [4], [8]. Also, some SOCs are moving away from a 
tiered structure to a single analyst role and replacing many 
of the existing manual tasks with SOAR (Security 
Orchestration, Automation and Response) [18]. Besides 
analysts, there are also other security professionals such as 
SOC engineers working in a SOC, as mentioned earlier. 
However, the focus of this study is on analysts. As such, 
other roles will not be discussed in this work. 
To ensure that analysts are meeting the objectives and 
goals of the SOC, managers draw on metrics to assess their 
performance. The word ‘performance’ in the context of this 
study can be defined as how well or badly a person does a 
piece of work or an activity [19]. Prior works suggest that 
there is a tendency for studies to focus on technology whilst 
ignoring the vital human element, even though SOC is made 
up of people, processes and technology [8]. Unfortunately, 
one of the problems with existing assessment methods is 
that several factors of the tasks expected of analysts are not 
taken into consideration according to the literature [11], 
[14]. This work takes steps towards contributing to filling 
this gap by identifying the main function expected of the 
analyst, amongst a list of many services offered by the SOC.  
Given that it is the analyst that makes most of the final 
decisions during operations [6], it comes as no surprise that 
their performance is of interest to stakeholders and SOC 
managers [14]. In fact, Shah et al. [20] explain that effective 
performance, such as the timely analysis of alert by the 
analysts is an essential characteristic of an efficient SOC. 
SOC managers and stakeholders, therefore, maintain a range 
of metrics and measures for the analysts. Next, we discuss 
the need for metrics and measures for a SOC analyst. 
 
B. The Need for Analysts’ Performance Metrics and 
Measures 
To appreciate the terminologies used in this work, a 
recap of the terms “metric” and “measure” are presented 
below. Black et al. [21] define a metric as a subjective, 
latent attribute that can have several measures. A measure, 
on the other hand, is concrete, objective and quantifiable 
data that can be used to create a metric. According to 
Sundaramurthy et al. [14], metrics impact on analysts’  
perception of their performance. They state that the more 
reflective a metric is to the analyst’s achievements, the 
greater their confidence when it comes to management 
evaluation. However, as they acknowledged, devising a 
useful performance metric is a challenge, as SOC managers 
do not even know what the right metric should be [14]. This 
problem is further complicated by the fact that the main 
functions of analysts that need to be taken into consideration 
when assessing analysts’ performance have not been 
investigated by prior works, to the best of our knowledge.  
While SOC managers and stakeholders rely on several 
qualitative and quantitative metrics and measures to assess 
the performance of analysts, the perception gleaned from 
literature is that these metrics and measures only focus on 
limited aspects/understanding of analysts’ operations. In 
fact, unless the key functional areas and aspects that should 
be measured are identified, from our perspective, it is not 
likely one can obtain insight into the holistic efforts of an 
analyst’s performance. Equally, unless holistic efforts of 
analysts’ performance are tracked, poor performance cannot 
be identified for appropriate action to be taken to improve 
productivity [22].  
Metrics and measures can be used to identify an 
analyst’s strength and to identify analysts’ training needs 
requirement. Unfortunately, extant literature posits that 
existing metrics do not fully reflect the efforts of analysts, 
which leads to dissatisfaction and drives down morale [14]. 
The question to ask is whether analysts’ and SOC managers’ 
views can be elicited to solve this current problem. This 
work takes steps towards answering this key question with 
the aim of using the knowledge gained to act as the 
foundation to establish how the performance of analysts can 
be evaluated. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
To design our framework, we adopted a qualitative 
research approach and drew on the case study research 
design suggested by Yin [23]. In our work, we wanted to 
investigate two important questions: (1) What are the main 
functions of a SOC analyst within a Security Operations 
Center? (2) What factors and criteria should be taken into 
consideration when assessing the performance of the 
analysts? To answer our research questions, we collected 
empirical interview data from analysts and SOC managers; 
we reviewed analysts’ workflow models/documents; carried 
out observation of analysts’ in a SOC and analyzed multiple 
sources of literature on SOCs [3]–[7], [10]–[12], [17]. Our 
case study design approach is similar to the work of 
Schinagl et al. [6], who proposed a framework for building 
SOC.   
Given that our study is exploratory in nature, we 
engaged with analysts and SOC managers to solicit their 
views on key analysts’ functions and the factors/criteria by 
which analysts’ efforts should be measured against.  Prior to 
engaging with participants, we sought ethical approval for 
our work from our institutional research ethics committee, 
as analysts and SOC managers are human subjects.  
The initial set of participants were recruited using 
contacts from the SOC industry. We then adopted a 
snowballing approach and requested participants to 
recommend other analysts and SOC managers that may be 
interested in taking part in this study. This strategy is similar 
to the approach adopted by Kokulu et al. [4]. All 
participants were asked to sign a consent form to approve 
their willingness to take part in the study. Once recruited, 
we requested participants to take part in a 1-hour one-to-one 
interview to share their opinions on SOC functions, 
analysts’ tasks, metrics and measures for analysts along with 
human factors that impact on their performance. To protect 
the participants’ identity, we used aliases. 
The interview questions were designed using insight 
from existing works and are grounded on the functions of a 
SOC suggested by previous researchers [5]–[7], [24]. The 
interviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed.  
Handwritten notes were taken during the interviews. During 
the interview, the tentative framework devised using insight 
from existing works was presented to the analysts to solicit 
their feedback. This was an opportunity for the analysts to 
comment on their functions and that of a SOC. The strategy 
of presenting a tentative framework to participants is similar 
to the work of Schinagl et al. [6].  To improve the credibility 
and the validity of our study we used multiple sources of 
evidence and interviewed multiple participants from 
different industries and applied the qualitative member 
check technique [25]. We did not stop conducting 
interviews until reaching a point of data saturation where 
new themes stopped emerging [26], [27]. 
IV. ANALYSIS AND STUDY FINDINGS 
 Eight (8) SOC analysts and four SOC (4) managers 
participated in our interviews. All the interviews were 
conducted face-to-face. Our participants were from five 
different industries: defence, airline, finance (banking), a 
global telecom company and the automobile industry. The 
participants were all experienced analysts and managers in 
their respective organisations. TABLE 1 shows the profile of 
our participants. 
 
TABLE 1. PARTICIPANTS PROFILE AND THEIR ORGANISATIONS 
Interviewee ID Type of Industry Job Title Years of Experience
I1 Airline SOC Analyst 8
I2 Airline SOC Manager 5
I3 Defence SOC Analyst 5
I4 Defence Senior SOC Analyst 9
I5
Managed Security Service 
Provider (MSSP)- Utility 
and  Airport
UK SOCs Manager
14
I6 Airline SOC Analyst 5
I7 Airline SOC Analyst 4
I8 Defence SOC Analyst 6
I9 Defence SOC Manager 2
I10 Finance (Banking) SOC Consultant 7
I11
Telecom Cyber Operations Specialist
5
I12
Automobile (Aerospace 
and Defence)
Cyber Incident Director and 
Head of Security Operations
10  
 
The engagement with SOC analysts and SOC managers 
resulted in several pages of interview transcript. To organize 
our data, we used the software package Nvivo 12. Nvivo 
does not perform any analysis but acts as a useful tool for 
organizing our data and complements our manual coding. 
To carry out our analysis, we opted for an accessible and 
flexible technique to analyze our interview data using 
thematic analysis  [28], [29]. According to Braun and Clarke 
[29], there is no ideal method for analysing interview data, 
however, the selected method must match what the 
researcher seeks to uncover. Thematic Analysis (TA) offers 
a useful method for identifying themes and patterns in data 
collected from the participants [28]. Under TA, researchers 
often use direct quotes and paraphrasing to increase the 
credibility of their analysis based on the data [28].  
TA, however, is a broad approach with several sub-
methods, giving a researcher an additional choice. The use 
of a tentative framework made one particular type of TA 
method the most appropriate for our work. This method is 
known as Template Analysis, developed by King [30]. In 
using Template Analysis, we draw inspiration from the 
work of Sundaramurthy and his colleagues on SOCs which 
utilizes a similar data analysis technique [31]. The template 
analysis process followed to analyze our data is described 
below. 
We began our data analysis using ‘a priori’ theme, 
which is allowed under template analysis, unlike some other 
forms of thematic analysis techniques such as Braun and 
Clarke's version of TA [32]. The initial set of themes were 
developed based around the functions of a SOC, tasks 
expected of the analysts and metrics for assessing analysts’ 
performance, as identified in existing works. We then 
proceeded to transcribing our audio-recorded interviews and 
reading through the interview transcripts to familiarize 
ourselves with the data. Sections of the interview notes 
relevant to the research questions were identified during the 
initial coding. We highlighted sections of the text that were 
relevant to understanding our objectives [32]. We applied a 
priori codes to those parts of the data. When a section of the 
interview data matches a research question, where there is 
no existing code, a new code is devised to cover it. The 
findings reported here are based on preliminary results of 
ongoing fieldwork. We continue to apply our develop 
template to our data set towards our effort to design a 
comprehensive approach for evaluating analysts’ overall 
performance. 
 
A. The main functions of an analyst in a SOC 
This section addresses the research question 1. Our 
participants mentioned several functions of a SOC and point 
out key tasks expected of analysts under different functions. 
TABLE 2 provides a summary of the main functions of a SOC 
and typical activities expected of the analysts undertaking the 
associated function. SOC functions identified are: 
Monitoring and Detection Function – Entails 
monitoring of computer network systems, devices and 
applications running on these devices to detect malicious or 
abnormal activity. One of our participants, I5, who is a SOC 
manager with fourteen years SOC experience, stated that the 
monitoring and detection function is at the heart of the SOC 
operation as it is the means by which threats can be 
identified by an analyst.  
Analysis Function – This function involves an in-depth 
investigation into observed abnormal/unusual activities seen 
across an organizational network. I3 stated that “you have to 
analyze all traffic and packets to know what is going on”. 
Response and Reporting Function – Involves the 
analyst taking specific actions as mandated by their local 
working processes to mitigate or reduce potential damage 
from an identified threat. I3, who manages an airline SOC, 
mentioned that response and reporting function is a primary 
function for an analyst. He argued that “there is no point of 
monitoring if you are not going to respond and report any 
abnormal activity”. Response function also entails 
producing both technical and non-technical reports to 
relevant stakeholders on incidents. 
Intelligence Function – Entails gathering of information 
on specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) from third 
parties and open sources to detect malicious activities. I10, 
who is a SOC consultant at one of the UK’s largest banks, 
explained that intelligence function is a crucial component 
of the services offered by a SOC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incident Management Function – Jacobs et al.[5] state 
that incident management is the ability to prepare, identify 
and escalate an incident. I1 and I5 highlight incident 
management function as an integral part of a SOC operation. 
According to I1, SOCs must have a containment and 
eradication plan as part of the overall incident management 
function.  
TABLE 2. GLOBAL SOC FUNCTIONS AND ANALYST TASKS 
SOC FUNCTIONS ANALYST FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES
Monitoring and Detection Function
•	Monitor network traffic and enterprise information 
technology devices using solutions such as SIEM 
(Security, Incident and Event Management), IDS/IPS 
(Intrusion Detection Security/Intrusion Prevention 
Systems) to identify in a timely manner malicious or 
anomalies activities.
•	Monitor to detect policy violation, cyber-attacks, 
security breaches or any unusual activity on the network. 
Monitoring of privilege user activities.
•	Identification of false positives and false negatives from 
sensors to decrease load on sensors and analysts. 
•	Deep packet inspection and Alert Triage.
•	Use packet analysis tools such as TCPDump, Snort and 
Wireshark to detect malicious network activity.
Analysis Function
•	Analysing log files and event data reported by the 
monitoring and detection tools. 
•	Visual inspection of logs and in-depth packet analysis of 
network traffic and alerts using a range of packet 
analyser tools such as Wireshark and TCPDump to 
establish whether an activity pose a threat to an 
organisation.
•	Draws on historical logs to confirm trends and patterns.
•	Conducting root cause analysis and creating script 
queries to investigate logs.
•	Triage and Escalation Analysis
Response and Reporting Function
•	Isolation of suspicious devices to reduce damage to the 
enterprise network
•	Use incident tracking system to create and track tickets.
•	Writing reports
Intelligence Function
•	Identify threat actors that may pose danger to an 
organisation
•	Exchanging threat information with various internal and 
external parties.
•	Correlate information on various threats that might 
affect an organisation.
•	Blacklisting known malicious IP addresses such as those 
linked to command and control activities.
•	Creating intelligence use cases scenarios to track new 
and emerging threats.
•	Create event correlation rules and rules for event 
filtering.
Baseline and Vulnerability Function
•	Vulnerability Scans
•	Patching and Patch management.
•	Finding vulnerabilities within the environment and 
applying patches.
Policies and Signature Management 
•	Writing and Tuning Correlation Rules
•	Content Modification to remove false positives.
Compliance and Risk Management Function Compliance Scans and Reporting
Incident Management/Handling Function
(Preparation, Identification, Containment, 
Eradication, Recovery, Lessons Learned)
Partly covered by Analyst but predomintely carried out 
by Incident Handlers working in a Computer Security 
Incident and Reponse Team (CSIRT)
Pentration (Pentest) Function/Red Team A Pentester Function
Forensic and Malware Analysis Function A Forensic Expert Function
Engineering and Collection Function SOC Engineer  
Baseline and Vulnerability Function –  This function 
entails patching and hardening of systems to address any 
known weaknesses in the system. I1 mentioned that analysts 
are expected to carry out vulnerability scanning of systems 
and report on any identified weaknesses. 
Policies and Signature Management Function – The 
SOC needs to maintain up-to-date use cases, also known as 
policies, and signatures on their technical toolings such as 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Security Information 
and Event Management (SIEM) to detect cyberattacks. I10 
states that poor use case and signature management will 
result in excessive amounts of false positives and increase 
the workload for an analyst.  
Compliance and Risk Management Function – This 
function entails the SOC supporting the business to meet 
any mandatory, industrial or regulatory requirements. 
Additionally, a SOC can support a business to identify the 
risk that they face. I10 mentioned that if  SOCs do not know 
the risk that the business faces, they cannot create effective 
use cases, policies or implement effective security controls. 
Penetration Testing (Pentest) Function – Involves the 
SOC simulating cyberattacks against an organisation’s 
computer network systems to test their current defences and 
how it will react when under attack. Participants mentioned 
that penetration testing is not a function for an analyst. For 
example, I10 and I11 mentioned that their SOCs employed a 
specialist to conduct these functions.  
Forensic and Malware Function – Entails the gathering 
and preservation of evidence relating to malicious activities 
in a manner that is acceptable to a court of law.  I3, I9, I10 
and I12 all mentioned that forensic and malware function is 
an important capability of a SOC. However, participants that 
mentioned this function explained that activities under this 
function are often carried out by a specialist team. For 
example, I3 described that forensic and malware functions 
are carried out by a specialist team that works closely with 
law enforcement agencies.  
Engineering and Log Collection Function – 
Maintenance of a SOC tooling and collection of logs is an 
essential component of a SOC. I5 stated that it would be 
impossible to detect attacks if a SOC did not collect logs 
from their network. He explained that although this is a 
function of a SOC, activities under the engineering and log 
collection would be conducted by a SOC engineer rather 
than an analyst. Jacobs et al. [5] state that log collection 
provides a centralized place for aggregating all security 
events and transactional activity. 
 
B. Assessing the Performance of Analysts 
This section relates to research question 2. Our 
participants talked about several factors that should be taken 
into consideration when assessing their performance, along 
with existing metrics and measures used in their SOCs. Over 
90% of our participants argued for analysts’ performance to 
be based on the “quality of their analysis” and the “quality 
of their report” rather than focusing on numbers, such as the 
number of tickets closed or opened. For example, I10 
suggested that “rather than just the output of what analysts 
are doing, they should be measured on the quality of their 
work”. A similar theme was observed across our data set. 
We found this surprising as most existing work typically 
talks about the use of absolute numbers, such as the number 
of incidents raised along with the mean time to detect 
(MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR)  [7], [8], 
[14].  
Quite often participants used the terms “metric” and 
“measure” interchangeably. The confusion between a metric 
and a measure was not a surprise because even 
cybersecurity researchers fail to make the distinction clear 
and some even use them interchangeably [33]. The top 
metrics and measures discussed by our participants are 
shown in TABLE 3.  
The quality of an analyst’s analysis and quality of their 
report were identified as the main KPI analysts and 
managers preferred. While there seems to be an agreement 
between SOC managers and their analysts on how analysts’ 
performance should be measured, the problem with the 
quality of analysis is that it is entirely subjective. I7, I8 and 
I11 point out that quality analysis is a reflection of the report 
written by the analyst as no one can know what is happening 
in the “head” of an analyst unless they document any 
analysis carried out in their report. Based on our analysis we 
argue that if “quality analysis” resides anywhere in a SOC, 
it will reside in the report written by the analyst.  
 
 
TABLE 3. TOP METRICS AND MEASURES MENTIONED BY 
PARTICIPANTS 
Metric Merit Drawback
Number of Incidents Raised
Easy to see analysts raising the 
majority of the incidents received 
by the SOC.
Drive analysts to wanting to do 
more.
Does not take into account the 
severity or priority of the incidents.
Does not account for analysts 
carrying out a detailed investigation.
Time taken to Detect, and Time taken 
to Respond to an Incident
Useful for assessing the vigilance 
of an analyst.
Useful for tracking if analysts are 
taking too long to respond to events 
and incidents
Difficult to put a timeline on how 
quick analysts should identify an 
incident.
Can lead to analysts spending less 
time to understand the root cause of 
the alert.
Does not take into account the 
gathering of collaborative evidence 
and stealthy attacks.
Number of Incidents Closed
Easy to see proactive analysts and 
those raising the majority of the 
incidents.
Useful for tracking a fair share of 
incident closure within the team.
Does not take into account 
complexity of the incidents.
May be outside of the analyst control.
Quality of Analysis
The benefit of this measure is that it 
focuses on the quality of analysts 
work as opposed to quantity.
Subjective and therefore difficult to 
measure.
Quality of Incident Report
The benefit of this measure is that it 
focuses on the quality of analysts 
work as opposed to quantity.
Subjective and therefore difficult to 
measure.
 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
This study focused on identifying the primary functions 
of a SOC and the key tasks expected of analysts within a 
SOC to facilitate the design of an approach to capture 
analysts’ holistic performance. In this work, we deduce the 
functions of analysts from the functions and services 
typically offered by a SOC. We introduce the term “Global 
SOC Function” to denote the major services expected from 
a SOC and argue that any organisation offering SOC 
services will offer at least one of the services in our 
framework. This claim was validated and confirmed by our 
study participants. 
Several themes emerged during our engagement with 
the participants. While we started with six initial themes on 
the functions of a SOC, five additional functions emerged 
during our engagement with the analysts, as shown in TABLE 
2. Although functions such as malware and forensic analysis 
were reported by analysts and also reported by existing 
literature [6], [7], our participants acknowledged that it was 
not a function for analysts. One participant, I10, commented 
that “we also have a forensic capability….but work is done 
by a forensic specialist but still part of our team”. Likewise 
I7 commented that, “I am an analyst and not a pentester but 
I engage with pen testers to create use cases that can feed 
into the intelligence function of a SOC”, again, illustrating 
that pen-test activities are outside the remit of analysts. 
Analysts would not be expected for their performance to be 
based on forensic and pen-test functions. 
We observed a number of recurring themes specifically 
on the functions expected of the analysts. All our 
participants agreed that analysts will be expected to monitor, 
detect, analyze and report security events. Indeed, the 
consensus was that these four activities: monitor, detect, 
analyze and report are at the core of analysts’ operations. 
Another observation is that baseline and vulnerability 
management, compliance and risk management function, 
along with polices and signature management functions, are 
not always carried out by analysts.  
Another interesting key pattern within our data relates 
to analysts’ and SOC managers’ agreement on the use of 
quality of analysis and quality of report as the assessment 
method. From our perspective, even though the word 
“quality” is subjective and difficult to measure, we are of 
the opinion that guidelines can be provided to assess the 
quality of analysis of analysts’ work and of their reports. 
D'Amico and Whitley [13] talk about different analysis 
conducted by analysts. I12, who is a cyber incident director 
and head of security operations, states that a guideline for 
assessing the quality of analysis is long overdue. We happen 
to concur and argue that unless there is a guideline on “how 
to” evaluate the “quality of analysis”, quality analysis will 
remain mysterious, potentially resulting in “elitists” among 
some analysts, who may see themselves as “seniors” or 
“experienced”. We also argue that having guidelines for 
evaluating quality analysis will help junior/inexperienced 
analysts to improve their analysis. Guidelines can also be 
useful in addressing the issues around tacit knowledge. 
When it comes to the use of time as an assessment 
method, analysts do not necessarily agree that managers 
should put a time on their activities because often times 
there are issues such as stealth attacks and reliance on third 
parties for collaborative evidence, which are outside their 
control. Analysts, however, recognize that SLA can mandate 
specific actions to be taken within certain timeframes. 
Although analysts and SOC managers preferred 
performance to be based on the quality of analysis and 
report, they acknowledged that using ‘absolute numbers’ is 
easier, as assessment based on “quality” is subjective.  
Based on the data received and our analysis of existing 
literature [5]–[7], [24], we next present core analysts 
functions and KPIs relevant for evaluating analysts 
performance. 
 
VI. TOWARDS ANALYST FUNCTIONS AND KPI FRAMEWORK   
In this section, we present factors that can be used to 
develop an approach for evaluating the overall performance 
of an analyst. While a SOC offers several services and 
functions, our fieldwork led us to uncover the real analysts' 
functions and key performance indicators (KPIs) that should 
be taken into consideration to assess analysts’ performance. 
Using empirical data collected from our participants and 
insight from existing works [5]–[7] [24], we propose the 
framework in Fig 1, depicting SOC functions, the functions 
expected of analysts and the main KPIs. Our framework has 
several parts/components. The components contained in the 
bottom half of our framework in the blue dotted line 
represent the eleven main functions of a SOC.  
Among the eleven functions identified, the functions in 
the red boxes are not performed by analysts but by a 
specialist team. The green filled boxes are the functions 
reported by our participants as foundational to any SOC. 
Participants expect any assessment method to take 
monitoring, detection, response and reporting into 
consideration. The blue boxes located in the blue dotted 
line: intelligence function, policies and signature 
management functions, baseline and vulnerability function, 
incident management function, along with compliance and 
risk management functions represent add-on functions for 
many SOCs, as reported by our participants.  
The top section of the framework, represented by the 
red dotted lines, represents the basic (primary) functions of 
a SOC. The red arrow between the yellow and the pink 
filled boxes illustrates that monitoring and detection activity 
is immediately followed by responding and reporting. 
Underpinning the “monitor and detect”, “respond and 
report” is the “analysis function” shown in the grey filled 
box. The criteria reported by participants as relevant to the 
assessment of analysts are represented in the orange filled 
box (quality, time and absolute number). Finally, the purple 
box contained in the red dotted line illustrates the main KPI 
participants suggest as required to capture the actual 
performance of analysts in a SOC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1. A framework depicting the functions of an analyst and 
factors that can be used to capture their overall effort. 
 
Our framework has some features that are similar to the 
risk-based framework for assessing cybersecurity 
capabilities of organizations proposed by the National 
Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), specifically 
within the critical infrastructure sectors [34]. Even though 
the NIST framework contains many of the core functions of 
a SOC such as identify, protect, detect, respond and recover, 
as shown in below in Fig 2, the actual framework in itself is 
not aimed at a SOC per se, to allow the identification of the 
main functions of analysts, in order to evaluate their holistic 
efforts. 
 
Fig 2. NIST Cybersecurity Framework [35]. 
Using our proposed framework, we argue that analysts’ 
holistic effort can be captured. We aim to do this as future 
work. This will assist SOC analysts, managers and 
stakeholders to assess analysts’ performance across the 
various functional areas. Cybersecurity researchers can also 
rely on our framework to develop new sets of performance 
metrics for the various functional areas.  
 
VII. RELATED WORK 
There have been prior works that seek to understand the 
functions of a SOC and the role of the analysts in the SOC. 
D'Amico and Whitley [13] investigate and report on how 
computer network defence (CND) analysts conduct analysis 
and report on six types of analysis often performed by 
analysts. They conclude that visualizations could support 
data analysis and facilitate the work of CND analysts.  
An anthropological study conducted by Sundaramurthy 
et al. [8] at three different SOCs identified team structures in 
a SOC, operational workflows of a SOC, along with several 
metrics for assessing analysts’ performance. Metrics 
reported in their work are the number of incidents raised by 
analysts, the use of success stories and the time it takes 
analysts to create a ticket. However, they acknowledge that 
existing metrics are inadequate and advocate for research to 
devise useful metrics for analysts. 
A continuation study by Sundaramurthy et al. [14], again 
using anthropology reports on burnout phenomenon among 
analysts as they carry out their function in the SOC. They 
identified factors that lead to burnout in the SOC and report 
on several metrics for assessing analysts’ performance. They 
observed that analysts are dissatisfied with existing metrics 
as they fail to take into consideration several aspects of the 
tasks they perform in a SOC. Lif and Sommestad [24] 
proposed a model for evaluating the performance of IDS 
operators, however, as they acknowledge, the work of IDS 
operators is a subset of those expected of the analysts. 
Jacobs et al. [5] proposed a model and a classification 
scheme for evaluating the effectiveness and capabilities of a 
SOC based on three aspects of a SOC: the maturity level; 
the SOC services; and capabilities of the services provided 
by the SOC. Their work identified functions of a SOC as: 
log collection; log retention and archival; log analysis; 
monitoring; threat identification and reporting. However, 
what they did not do was to identify which of those 
functions are actually performed by analysts.  
Schinagl et al. [6] present what they called a generic 
building block of a SOC and identify several functions of a 
SOC. Using these functions, they devised an assessment 
method to assess the effectiveness of the services provided 
by a SOC. Although their framework has been accepted by 
the Dutch security community as a model for building SOCs 
or improving SOC services, the authors did not elaborate on 
specific analysts’ tasks or functions expected of analysts that 
should be measured to capture their holistic performance.  
Onwubiko [7] presents a framework for a SOC that 
consists of log collection, analysis, incident response, 
reporting and continuous monitoring. He briefly discusses a 
number of metrics for assessing the performance of analysts, 
which are consistent with metrics suggested by 
Sundaramurthy and his colleagues [8], [14].  
Kokulu et al. [4] conduct a qualitative study on SOCs to 
identify the main issues and challenges faced by SOCs. 
Among the numerous issues reported was ineffective 
metrics in SOCs. They argued that current quantitative 
metrics such as the number of incidents raised and time 
taken to react to an incident are not effective, because they 
fail to take into consideration the severity and priority of the 
events. 
The main difference between this work and that of 
previous work is that we identify the key analysts’ functions 
and factors that need to be taken into consideration to 
evaluate the holistic effort of analysts. None of the studies 
described in the related work identifies criteria that need to 
be taken into account to capture the holistic performance of 
an analyst. 
VIII. CONCLUSION, LIMITATION AND FUTURE WORK 
SOC analysts are expected to demonstrate high human 
performance, as poor performance impacts on the efficiency 
of a SOC. To evaluate the performance of analysts, SOC 
managers and stakeholders use metrics and measures. 
However, existing literature points out that extant metrics 
and measures are unsatisfactory as these fail to take into 
consideration the several functions of a SOC analyst. 
Currently, there is no agreement on what constitutes the core 
functions of analysts. Using empirical data and insight from 
prior works, we propose a framework that captures the main 
functions expected of the analysts and factors that need to be 
taken into consideration to assess the efforts of analysts. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study to 
provide core factors that can be used to develop a holistic 
approach to evaluate analysts’ performance.  
Our research results indicate that SOC functions that 
should be taken into consideration when assessing analysts 
performance are: monitoring and detection function; 
analysis function; response and reporting function; 
intelligence function; baseline and vulnerability function; 
along with policies and signature management functions. 
Among these functions, analysts and SOC managers identify 
monitoring and detection, response and reporting, along 
with analysis function as foundational and advocate for 
these to be included in any performance assessment. The 
following factors/criteria: quality of an analyst’s analysis, 
quality of an analyst’s report, time-based measures and 
absolute numbers derived from analysts’ tasks were 
identified as the main key performance indicators necessary 
for evaluating the performance of the analyst.  
A limitation of this work is that although the member-
checking strategy used in this study is considered as one of 
the validation techniques of qualitative research, it remains 
subjective and limited to the opinions of the participants. 
Future work will focus on extending our framework to 
propose a new approach for measuring analysts’ 
performance. 
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